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Process theodicy - Creation out of chaos and the problem of evil (David Ray Griffin): Part 1
Information: A review of David Griffin's process theodicy essay from
Davis S. T.
(Ed.), Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, Westminster John Knox Press; Rev Ed edition, 2001
Introduction
David Griffin introduces his essay on process theodicy with a discussion on the first words from the Bible:
In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth (Genesis 1:1)
Now the traditional (and preferred) Christian reading and translation of this text, has been to regard this as creation out-of-nothing (ex nihilo). However, Griffin draws attention to the fact that an alternative reading and translation of the same text, is also available (and as far as he is concerned it is also preferred by Hebrew scholars):When God began to create the heavens and the earth, the earth was without form and void (Genesis 1:1)
Now the issue of biblical translation may be a strange one to begin a discussion on process theodicy
with, but for Griffin it is important because how we read Genesis 1:1 raises an
important issue, which for him is the bugbear of all
theodicy's: Did God have full control over the way the world was created. In
other words, did God has created the heavens and the earth
literally out of nothing, or out of some pre-existing matter (i.e. bringing order out of chaos). The former has been the traditionally accepted understanding of creation in the
Christian Church, whilst
the latter resonates more with Ancient Near East creation myths. In particular
it is found in Plato's
Timaeus,
where we find an account of how the 'Demiurge'
worked with materials which were not
totally compliant to its will, in order to create the best world it could. Thus (rather like a
potter), the Demiurge 'works to create out of something, a world that is as good
'as possible'. This means (for Plato) that the world we live in represents a victory of 'persuasion' (only what
could only be),
rather 'necessity' (or what should actually be - see Griffin p.102).
Plato's account of the creation of the world, introduces the idea that pre-existing matter placed limits on what the 'Demiurge' could do with it. This is because they were not created ex nihilo, and as such were not totally subject to its will.
Something to do: Take a piece of paper and see how many times you can fold it in half. Compare how many times you can do this using smaller or larger sheets. You will find that despite how hard you try, you will find it difficult to fold a piece of paper in half more than eight times! As you attempt this task, think of how it relates to Plato's account of the Demiurge.
Re-understanding the traditional Christian view of God
Griffin accepts that Plato's creation account runs contrary to the generally accepted view that God is all-powerful (omnipotent), and able to do anything. However, he believes that the majority of biblical passages dealing with the matter of Creation, do actually lend favourable support for the idea that the world was created out of pre-existing 'stuff'. Although elsewhere in his essay he seem to go back on this (saying that, 'the biblical support is ambiguous' (Griffin p.102)), he advocates this re-reading of the Bible because creation ex nihilo raises more problems, than it solves. For Griffin it is far better to adopt the idea that God was limited by pre-existing materials, than to say God was unhindered, when trying to construct a credible theodicy.
The problem Griffin is trying to address is that if God was free to create the world in any way God chose, why did God create one where evil and suffering was present, or had the opportunity to occur in?
So what according to Griffin is the theological solution to the problem of evil, and why does he want to reject the popular teaching that God created the heavens and the earth 'ex nihilo', in favour of one which sees God struggling to bring order out of chaos? First, he considers that the traditional position results in seeing evil as that which contributes to a higher good. If God created a world which has evil in it, this suggests that God allows evil events to occur, and this must be so that a greater good (God's will) may result. Secondly, this means bad things which occur in the world can only be apparently evil, rather than actually evil. Griffin rejects this because he thinks a theodicy should deal with the problem of real evil, and see it as that which does not contribute to any 'greater good' on the part of humanity, or God.
Thirdly, Griffin rejects any notion of God's self-limitation, whereby God has voluntarily given up power.
Instead, he wants to introduce the idea that evil exists, because God's power is
fundamentally limited in
a real sense (i.e. God really is limited in what God can do). Now this limit on God's power could either be due to the presence of other realties (i.e.
things which have their own
power), or because of limitations in God's own nature, (i.e. maybe God has a 'dark side') or that
maybe in a range of 'possible worlds', God cannot bring into existence a world without evil.
Whatever, Griffin has rejected the traditional
belief in God's omnipotence (and divine self-limitation), in favour of one where
God is limited in God's essential being (or nature). If this were not the case, then God
would have to held accountable for not creating
about a world devoid of genuine evil (which for Griffin does not make the world a better place).
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Limiting what God could do and why
The rejection of creation ex nihilo, is fundamental to Griffin's theodicy. Instead of a God who can do anything, we instead have a God who worked with pre-existent 'materials', to create the world and the universe. In doing so, we introduce the possibility that these 'materials' might have had some innate power of their own, with which they could thwart God's will (a point made earlier in connection with Plato's Timaeus). Furthermore, there might have also been 'eternal principles' that determined the way these materials' could be ordered (or arranged), and what could be done with them, thus imposing further limits on what God make from them. If this were not the case, and if God were truly omnipotent, then everything is dependent on God and any power pre-existent materials might have had could be over-ridden (or withdrawn) by God at any time. So by challenging and removing the traditional notion of divine omnipotence, Griffin allows for the possibility that these pre-existent 'materials' are capable of self-determination (partially), and have the ability to influence other things around them.
God cannot control but can only persuade (Griffin p.105)
Another key tenet in Griffin's theodicy is the belief that the world and everything in it, is here due to evolutionary processes. Griffin takes the evolutionary position as his starting point, because he believes that the notion that God created the world ex nihilo is an out-dated (unscientific) view. Also, within an evolutionary context Griffin is able to make more sense out of the notion of God's omnipotence, to show, 'why a God whose power is essentially unlimited would use such a long, and pain-filled method' of creating the world, and everything in it (Griffin p.106). In other words, if evolution is a true account of how everything got here, and God is the author of this process, why did God choose to allow things to evolve through a long drawn-out process, based on the death and destruction of millions of species?
Why did God take so long to get to the main act? (Griffin p.106)
Power and value
An evolutionary worldview provides the backdrop for Griffin's four notions of power and value. These are structured (by him) in such a way that a rise or fall in any of them, causes a corresponding rise or fall in others. These four notions are:
- The capacity to enjoy intrinsic goodness (or value).
- The capacity to suffer intrinsic evil (or dis-value).
- The power of self-determination.
- The power to influence others (for good or for evil).
Griffin believes there is a hierarchy in the capacity for everything in the world and the universe, to experience enjoyment and suffering. Whether something is more or less complex does not matter, for all things have the potential to experience 'pleasure' or 'pain' (to use some popular ethical notions). Furthermore, less complex things (E.g. electrons, atoms, cells) also find their power/value correlation compounded into more complex ones (E.g. animals and humans). This means that the more complex something is, the more richer its experiences will be. It also means that the more complex something is, the more it has the potential to do greater good or evil in the world. Thus Griffin argues:
Increased complexity [in an] organism seems to be the condition for increased richness of experience, hence of increased intrinsic goodness... However, every increase in this hierarchy is Janus-faced: each increase in the capacity to enjoy intrinsic goodness is likewise an increase in the capacity to suffer (Griffin p.107 [Bracket mine]).
So the issue of why there is evil and suffering in the world is simply to do with the way things are: the presence of evil and suffering being a residue of the potential for all beings to realise degrees of goodness in the world.
To have the good is necessarily to risk the bad (Griffin p.107)
Therefore, evil and suffering is not present in the world as a result of a 'Fall', or because humans directly disobeyed God. Nor does evil and suffering challenge God's essential goodness. Evil and suffering exists in the world simply because that is that the way things are. If we want to have good things, we must allow for the possibility that sometimes bad things happen too.
The greater an individual's power of self-determination (freedom), the greater their potential for experiencing goodness (value). The greater their potential for experiencing goodness, the greater their potential for experiencing evil, and doing other than the will of God. This is the way power/value correlate.
Something to think about: A theodicy normally justifies the goodness of God, in a world where evil and suffering exists. Before continuing to read Part 2 of this article, consider whether David Griffin's Process Theodicy is doing this, or not?
Creation out of chaos and the problem of evil: Part 2
Further reading
- The Center for Process Studies (External link)
- Articles related to the theme or topic of the problem of evil and suffering