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The concept of personhood in moral philosophy (Part 3): The fetus as person at birth argument

Information: This is Part 3 in a series of articles looking at the question of when a fetus becomes a person (or attains personhood), and the arguments moral philosophers use to justify or reject this. In this section we consider the argument that the fetus should be deemed a person only after it is born.

The fetus as person at birth argument

In light of the problems trying to define the nature of a person, and establishing when this occurs prior to birth, some moral philosophers have opted to defend the notion that the fetus becomes a person at birth (and with that it acquires the full moral and legal rights associated with personhood). In other words, the fetus only becomes a person when it is born.

Although this solution to the problem of fetal personhood is not without its problems (as we shall see), it is grounded on a rather obvious point that everyone will agree with, no matter what their views on abortion: Whenever we count the number of people around us, we only count those who are born.

Pregnant woman

Something to discuss: How many people are there in this picture? How many people do you see in this picture? (Picture source: www.topnews.in)

Although a population census would not include the unborn, under certain US laws it is possible for someone to be tried for causing the death of an unborn child (implying that the fetus has at least some rights associated with personhood). For example, in December 2008 a Minnesota a man was found guilty of second-degree murder and first-degree assault for repeatedly punching his friend’s pregnant girlfriend in the stomach, and causing her to go into labor. The woman was six months pregnant at the time, and although she gave birth to a 2 pound baby girl, the infant died soon after of head injuries caused by the attack. (Click here to read more about this story)

One of the indisputable strengths of the person at birth argument, is that it gives us a definite point at which to acknowledge the personhood on a fetus. Birth is not an arbitrary stage in the developmental cycle of the fetus, but a time when its life-experience changes significantly for all to see:

'Once a human being emerges from the womb and others are able to care for it, there are crucial changes in what is involved in preserving its life. And the crucial change is that sustaining its life violates no right of its biological mother. Thus birth, which marks this change, is not an arbitrary point for commencing recognition of personhood' (Callahan J. C., The Fetus and Fundamental Rights)

A supporter of the person at birth argument is Mary Anne Warren, who in her essay The Moral Significance of Birth argues that treating fetuses as persons in the womb will have damaging implications for pregnant women, and their right to personal freedom and autonomy.

'There’s only room for one person with full and equal rights inside a human skin.'

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Warren argues that if a fetus is deemed to be a person prior to birth, then pregnant women will become stripped of their own personhood and become treated as, 'an inanimate object – containers which may be opened at the will of others in order to get at their contents'. To support her point, she cites the case of Angie Carder:

'Perhaps the most troubling illustration of this… is the case of Angie Carder, who died at George Washington University Medical Center in June 1987, two days after a court-ordered Caesarean section. Ms Carder had suffered a recurrence of an earlier cancer, and was not expected to live much longer. Her physicians agreed that the fetus [she was carrying] was too underdeveloped to be viable, and that Carder herself was too weak to survive the surgery. Although she, her family, and the physicians were all opposed to a Caesarean delivery, the hospital administration – evidently believing it had a legal obligation to try and save the fetus – sought and obtained a court order to have it done. As predicted, both Carder and her infant died soon after the operation. This woman's rights to autonomy, physical integrity, and life itself were forfeit – not just because of her illness, but because of her pregnancy.' [Bracket mine]

On April 26th 1990, the Washington D.C. Court of Appeals overturned the legal precedent set in the wake of this case, ruling that Angela Carder did indeed have the right to make health care decisions for herself and her fetus. In response to one of the hospital’s attorneys, who argued that it was appropriate to sacrifice the life of a dying women for the sake of her fetus, one of the judges is said to have responded, 'Are you urging this court to find that you can handcuff a woman to a bed and force her to give birth?'. Angela Carder’s parents subsequently sued the hospital for deprivation of human rights, discrimination, wrongful death and malpractice. In November 1990 the hospital settled the lawsuit out of court for an undisclosed sum of money, and with it the promise that they would review their policies protecting the rights of pregnant women.

Aside from the issue of depersonalisation, Mary Anne Warren also argues that treating the fetus as a person prior to birth means mothers could (in theory) be prosecuted for not taking adequate care of their unborn child:

'Women will increasingly be blamed, and sometimes legally prosecuted, when they miscarry or give birth to premature, sick, or abnormal infants.' (Warren M. A., The Moral Significance of Birth)

Warren's point is that women could (in theory) end up being prosecuted for getting too much or not enough exercise, for eating the wrong sort of food or not enough, for taking the wrong kind of drugs or having failed to take certain others, for having smoked or drank alcohol, or because they lived near a place where there was industrial pollution, or stayed in a relationship with an abusive partner whilst pregnant. All these charges would be possible (Warren contends), if we allow the unborn to have the same moral and legal rights as the born.

Of course, if we refuse to recognise the fetus as a person, and if we refuse to allow it the same moral and legal rights associated with personhood, then it seems we put ourselves into a situation where even days or moments before it is due to be born the fetus has very few or even no rights, and women appear to be under no moral or legal obligation to protect or preserve its life if they choose not to.

Naturally many would consider it preposterous to think that days before she is about to give birth, a women would want her soon-to-be born child dead; if for no other reason than it does not reflect the normal experience of most women who are about to deliver a baby. For anyone who has been present at the birth of a child will know that immediately prior to its birth, every effort is made to monitor and protect the infant's life (as well as the mother's).

Newborn baby moments after being born

Newborn baby moments after being born (Copyright: www.solarnavigator.net)

'You do not lose your right not to be killed simply by walking from one room to another.' (Callahan J. C., The Fetus and Fundamental Rights)

The concept of personhood in moral philosophy (Part 4): Fetal sentience and personhood

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