Charles Stephenson's development of Emotivism and critiques

Emotivism

Moral theory

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Charles Stephenson's development of Emotivism and critiques

Information: This is Part 2 of an article exploring the fundamental features of Emotivism (as set out in chapter 6 of A. J. Ayer's book Language, Truth and Logic (1936)), as well considering some of the developments Charles Stephenson made to this ethical philosophy. Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are from the 1971 edition of Language, Truth and Logic. A version of this article was originally published on the website www.faithnet.org.uk.

The function of ethical language

A simplistic reading of Ayer's Emotivism might conclude that according to him, moral statements have no meaningful function to them. In other words, if moral statements do not have any factual content, then there appears to be no point to any ethical debate. In his book The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1986), James Rachels refers to this as 'simple subjectivism', and suggests that this can lead to the notion that, 'Where morality is concerned, there are no "facts," and no one is "right [or wrong]' (Rachels, p.31 [Brackets mine]), and that this is the slippery-slope towards moral (and cultural) relativism.

However, although Ayer argues that ethical statements have no factual content, he does not believe they have no meaningful function.

'It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only to express feeling. They are calculated to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action.' (p.143 [Emphasis mine])

In fact, Ayer is highly critical of the philosopher G. E. Moore for saying that, 'if ethical statements were simply statements about the speaker's feelings, it would be impossible to argue about questions of value'. Instead, Ayer claims it should be obvious that we, 'discuss questions of value, and... that the particular form of subjectivism [Moore] was discussing was false' (p.145f [Brackets mine]).

Charles Stephenson and Emotivist theory

In his book Ethics and Language (1947), American philosopher Charles Stephenson argued that although moral statements had been correctly analysed as expressions of feeling, that such statements also contained in them elements of persuasion. For example, to say 'Stealing is wrong' is not only to day that one disapproves of this act (I do not like stealing), but also to suggest that others should not steal things. By acknowledging a persuasive element in moral statements, Stephenson introduced the idea that real meaningful discussion can be had between people of different views.

Smiley on the phone If moral statements consist of nothing more than expressions of feeling, this would make debating moral issues simply a matter of who could shout the loudest! However, if moral statements are more than this, then a more productive debate and enquiry into 'truth' can take place.

Therefore, the key issue in any moral dispute (as far as Stephenson was concerned), was that underlying each person's moral views are fundamental principles, which are the reason why people disagree with each other. For example, when two doctors are discussing the best way to treat a patient, '[They] may disagree about which method to employ to treat a patient, but they aren't disagreeing about the necessity to treat the patient (Bowie R, Ethical Studies, Nelson Thornes LTD, 2001 p.80 [Brackets mine]). Therefore, meaningful debate can be had within the context of these principles, rather than the moral propositions which are an expression of them.

Although Stephenson focused on the percussive element in moral enquiry, it is wrong to think that this component was therefore missing from Ayer's original discussion of the matter - for it was not. Ayer simply believed that moral enquiry began with the facts surrounding a case:

'If anyone doubts [this]... let [them] try to construct even an imaginary argument on a question of value which does not reduce itself to an argument about a question of logic or about an empirical matter of fact.' (p.148 [Brackets mine])

This means that questions concerning what people believe and why they hold such beliefs, are the only genuine 'facts' in moral debates, and as such they are the only basis for any useful moral debate:

'We take note of these experiences as providing data for our psychological and sociological generalisations. And this is the only way in which they serve to increase our knowledge. It follows that any attempt to make our use of ethical... concepts as the basis of a metaphysical theory concerning the existence of a world of values, as distinct from the world of facts, involves a false analysis of these concepts.' (p.151)

Criticisms of Emotivism

Emotivism is a particular view of moral language, grounded in the philosophy of Logical Positivism. As such, where the latter is said to 'fail', so might the former. In recent years Logical Positivism has become a much maligned philosophical school. This occurred in large part because Logical Positivists were said to be grounding their ideas on fundamental principles, which could not be verified by their own methodology.

Something to think about: Logical Positivists say that statements are 'true' if they can be proved true by either experience, or if they are logically true. On what basis can this claim be justified (i.e. what additional 'proof' would you need in order to show that what Logical Positivists are claiming here is true)?

One might be tempted to discredit Emotivism for the same reasons as Logical Positivism, yet before doing so it is important to keep in mind the following:

Emotivism does not propose a methodology for making moral decisions. It is simply an analysis of the nature and content of ethical language.
Emotivism begins with the assumption that ethical language is non-factual. Thus, Emotivism stands apart from any ethical theory which attributes factual content to ethical propositions.

There is also one more aspect to be kept in mind, as one considers the relationship between Emotivism and Logical Positivism:

Logical Positivism attempted to define the nature and limits of knowledge, on the basis analytic and synthetic statements. This meant 'facts' were defined insofar as they were analytically or synthetically demonstrated. However, Emotivism removes all factual content from ethical language; it does not discuss 'ethical facts'.

By analysing moral language as something devoid of factual content, any criticism of Emotivism which suggests it gives us no foundation from which to act is invalid. This is because Emotivists never claimed to be providing a foundation for morality, nor are they able to. They are simply telling us about the nature of moral langauge.

In their book The Puzzle of Ethics, Vardy and Grosch show how easily it is to overlook the non-factual approach to moral language within Emotivism, when they offer the following criticism:

'If all ethical conduct and behaviour is simply about how we feel, if it is to do just with our psychological response to something, then how can we be sure of anything?' (Vardy P & Grosch P, The Puzzle of Ethics (Revised Edition), Fount Paperbacks: London, 1999 p.83)

As we just noted, to criticise Emotivism for failing to offer a suitable foundation for how we act is wrong. Ayer made it quite clear that he was not proposing to use, 'ethical... concepts as the basis of a metaphysical theory concerning the existence of a world of values' (p.151). Thus Vardy and Grosch are wrong to try and critique Emotivism for not providing any justification for a system of values; something it was never intended to do, nor is capable of doing.

Vardy and Grosch continue to overlook this fact about Emotivism when they write, 'The principle difficulty with Emotivism is that if we accept it as offering the justifiable analysis of moral discourse, then all moral debate becomes, at the end of the day, just so much hot air, and nothing else' (Vardy & Grosch (1999) p.83). However, this criticism too has significant shortcomings.

For instance, one might want to talk about and describe the methods Leonardo Da Vinci used to paint the Mona Lisa, as this is not only interesting but might also be useful to other painters. However, whether one feels the painting is any good (interpretation), is equally worthy of discussion. Yet if one was to follow Vardy's and Grosch's line of reasoning, one would never discuss what anyone felt about the Mona Lisa painting, for such a discussion would be pointless because it is simply about what people feel about something (which would be (sic.) 'so much hot and air, and nothing else').

Yet surely there are times when a person's feelings about a matter are going to be justified not because they have proved them to be true (were that ever possible), but simply because of who is expressing their opinion (i.e. maybe the the person telling us what they feel about the Mona Lisa painting might be a respected art-critic, or art-historian).

I am sure that if asked to venture their opinion on a moral subject, both Vardy and Grosch would say that their 'opinion' is significantly more justified than (say) that of a first year student of ethics, due to the fact that they have read and studied significantly more about the subject.

James Rachels also appears to make the same critical error as Vardy and Grosch, in his critique of Emotivism:

'A truth of ethics is a conclusion that is backed by reasons: the "correct" answer to a moral question is simply the answer which has the weight of reason on it side.' (Rachels J, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Second Edition), McGraw-Hill Inc: New York,1993 p.40)

This criticism is only valid provided Emotivists are making 'normative' ethical claims; which they are not. Ayer never allowed the discussion to enter the arena of 'ethical fact', so Emotivism cannot be compared and critiqued on the same grounds as 'normative' ethical theories. It is simply a non-starter to ask Emotivists to explain and justify 'the correct answer' to moral issues, unless they are making statements which can be justified; which they are not.

However, that said Emotivists do run into problems when they imply the function of ethical language is to arouse feeling, and stimulate action. At this point they are suggesting that ethical language is more than just an expression of feeling, and that it has some 'normative' quality to it (this being the intention to stimulate others to act in a way they believe to be right). Yet this begs the following question; on what basis can Emotivists justify the feelings which cause people to do things? Rachels believes this is Emotivism's greatest weakness; it cannot justify why one person's feelings about a matter should be any better (or more valid) than another's.

However, once again the question is not about facts but authority. Although a respected art-critic/historian might not be expressing facts about what they feel about the Mona Lisa painting, they are noted for having the authority to express their feelings about it. What Emotivism cannot do is to give any reason why they have this authority, or why some feelings can and should be used to stimulate people to act (and act morally), as opposed to other's. They do not give any reason because they cannot give one. All they can do is draw attention to the reasons why people have the different views they have, and then let the reader decide:

'The critic, by calling attention to certain features of the work under review, and expressing his own feelings about them, endeavours to make us share his attitude towards the work as a whole.' (Ayer p.150)

Yet this overlooks a fundamental feature of why people act the way they do; they act in certain ways because they believe they have good reason to so. Despite the Emotivist's suggestion that ethical language is non-factual, people tend to believe they are in possession of the facts about a matter on which to base their actions (or what to them is a good reason to do something, if not for others). To act without any knowledge, or without any idea of what will happen if one does something, could be said to be a rather unhealthy (and unhelpful) approach life!

Final thoughts...

Adolf Hitler salutes the crowd Both Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King gave very powerful and emotive speeches, and these stimulated many people to act. However, can we agree that both men were a justified source of moral inspiration, simply because they aroused feelings and stimulated action in people?

In the end, Emotivism is nothing more than an analysis of Ethical Language; some say a very useful one (some not). And whether there is any point to such a debate, is for the reader to decide.

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Charles Stephenson's development of Emotivism and critiques