That Religious Studies Website

Freewill

• Freewill: Some preliminary thoughts...
• Freewill and some suggestions for resolving the determinism/freewill paradox

Moral theory

• Deontology
• Emotivism
• Feminist Ethics
• Freewill
• Religion and Ethics
• Situation Ethics
• Utilitarianism
• Virtue Ethics

Recently added to the site

• The Ontological Argument: Introduction and Overview (Video)
• Visit to a Cathedral (Roman Catholic)
• Revision quiz: The Ontological Argument (Anselm of Canterbury)
• Revision quiz: Design arguments for the existence of God (Judeo-Christian): Part 1
• Revision quiz: Martin Luther King Jr.: Key facts
• Worksheet: Martin Luther King Jr.: The Early Years

Freewill and some suggestions for resolving the determinism/freewill paradox

Information: The determinism and freewill debate is primarily about whether we live in a world in which every effect has a cause (determinism), or a world of flux and random events (Libertarianism). This article reviews some of the key issues surrounding the notion of freewill, and reviews some proposed resolutions to the determinism/freewill paradox. A version of this article was originally published on the website www.faithnet.org.uk.

Freewill

'Though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances; and that what is really inspiriting and ennobling in the doctrine of free-will, is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our own character; that our will, by influencing some of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or capabilities of willing.' (Mill J. S., Autobiography, 1873)

Libertarianism (freewill) is the opposite to determinism, this being the idea that every event (x) is the sum of prior causes (y). However, to insist that humans have freewill is not to say that we (humans) are 'free' to do anything. For instance, we are not free to lay eggs or live in this world without experiencing the force of gravity, no matter how much we might want to do these things. Furthermore, although people might choose to do certain things, they might not have freely chosen to do them.  For instance, if someone is pointing a loaded gun at someone's head forcing them to do something, (this being an external constraint), they either have the choice to do what this person wants or get shot. Or, if someone has a certain type of personality disorder (this being an internal constraint), they might have freely chosen to steal a certain thing, but not really have any control over the compulsion to steal. In these instances, the choices people (although their choice to do them) are not strictly 'free', as they have been caused by something else impinging on them.

Good evidence to support the determinist's position can be found in the world(s) of science, which basically operate according to the principle that for every every event (x) there are prior causes (y). However, this 'principle' gets rather blurred the closer we get to the sub-atomic. One of the people to discover this was Werner Heisenberg (1901-76), who through his experiments showed that it was impossible to know both the speed and position of a sub-atomic particle at the same time. This has subsequently come to be known as the Heisenberg Principle.

One might liken the Heisenberg's principle to that of trying to establish the exact speed and position of a wave in the ocean. Although we can know the position of a wave at certain points, the speed it is traveling can only be determined as it moves along. Thus we can never know the speed and position of a wave at the same time, but only the speed or position of it at different times!

All this has interesting implications for our knowledge of things in the world. For if everything in the world is made up of sub-atomic particles, but these are unpredictable phenomena under certain conditions, then this suggests a degree of uncertainty about our knowledge of things in the world. In terms of our present discussion, uncertainty at the sub-atomic level appears to directly contradict the determinist's view of things, and might also be the basis for arguing that we have freewill.

Moral freedom

'Determinism puts in doubt all "life's hopes, personal feelings, knowledge, moral responsibility, the rightness of actions, and the moral standing of persons. (Honderich T. (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy)

The main challenge to the determinist's view of things, is in the realm of morality. For instance, if we say that the act of shooting someone dead is simply the sum total of prior causes that led to this behaviour, then it is not so far from this to say that the person shooting someone had "No choice" but to act in this way, and that what they did was out of their control and they were an innocent victim of circumstances. As such, determinism seems to undermine any attempt to argue for moral responsibility (and accountability).

A famous advocate of the free-will position was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). He believed that having freewill was absolutely vital if people were to be seen to be making genuinely moral choices, and also to be held responsible (or accountable) for their actions. He also believed that moral decisions involved a struggle to do what was 'right' (our 'duty'), and that without this 'struggle' one was simply acting according to various impulses (or desires). Also, without any decision-making process, one is simply at the mercy of one's emotions, feelings, impulses, desires etc. (which is essentially the determinist's position).

Kant's freewill argument has been so influential, that it is basically an unchallenged and fundamental tenet of moral enquiry.

However, one of the challenges faced by those who stress the importance of freewill, is that if acting morally requires one to make genuinely free choices, then this is going to undermine any idea of moral absolutes or source of moral truth. For instance, Kant was notoriously against the idea that acting morally was about (blindly) obeying a higher power (i.e. God), and instead argued that what was 'good' was what made rational sense (as this required people to think about what they are doing). Yet without some foundation for 'The Good', we are simply left with arbitrary opinions as to what this is, which may then lead one to moral relativism (the belief that what is 'good' is a cultural/personal thing) and nihilism (a rejection of all moral standards).

Something to think about: If one needs to be free to act morally, does this mean it is wrong to obey the law?

Advertisement

Soft-determinism/Compatibilism

'How could morality (with its central presupposition that there is free will) be reconciled with science (that says every event must have a cause)?' (Ninian Smart)

Problems with reconciling the determinist and freewill position, have led some to posit soft-determinism (or Compatibilism). This is the belief that we are free in our moral choices, even though all physical events are the sum of prior causes. This view was famously expressed by G. E. Moore (1873-1958) when he said:

'I would have done otherwise had I chosen to do so.'

Some readers may feel that soft-determinists are simply refusing to admit to full determinism. For Moore's claim, 'I would have done otherwise had I chosen to', is still an admission of being determined by prior causes (i.e. he choose not to do x instead of y because the circumstances were such that he made this choice, and not some other). This means that soft-determinism works provided we stay in the vicinity of the immediate situation, for any wider perspective on the matter will very quickly reveal the 'hand of the puppeteer' guiding their choices.

Immanuel Kant's resolution of the determinism and freewill paradox

Although Kant was a strong advocate of freewill, he was also aware that we live in a world of cause and affect. However, Kant believed that our knowledge of this world of cause and effect, is something we something we project onto it. In other words, we perceive the world in this way in order to make sense of it. In doing so, Kant made a distinction between the phenomenal realm (the world as we experience and perceive it) and the noumenal realm (the world as it is - beyond our experience of it - but nonetheless hypothesised to exist).

In making a distinction between our knowledge of things as we perceive them and as they truly are, Kant is implying that determinism is merely an illusion within the phenomenal realm, for in (the noumenal) reality, we are actually free beings. Furthermore, real choices can be made outside space and time. However, this does not resolve the determinist/freewill paradox, but merely shifts it elsewhere. For instance, how can we make choices outside space and time, and what relevance would these choices have in a world bound by space and time? Furthermore, the fact that Kant claimed we could never experience the noumenal realm but merely posit its existence, resolves nothing in reality - only in theory.

Back to top