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Process theodicy - Creation out of chaos and the problem of evil (David Ray Griffin): Part 2

Information: This is Part 2 of a review of David Griffin's process theodicy essay from Davis S. T. (Ed.), Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, Westminster John Knox Press; Rev Ed edition, 2001. Click here to read Process theodicy - Creation out of chaos and the problem of evil (David Ray Griffin): Part 1. A version of this article was originally published on the website www.faithnet.org.uk.

The freedom to choose

Now one could argue that if humans have the power for self-determination, then why is it that God did not make us all rational saints (always choosing the good)? The answer, according to Griffin, is that God could not. This is not to say that the idea of God creating people who only chose to do good, is a logically contradictory idea. Rather, God could not create self-determining beings, who were only capable of only choosing the good. In other words, God cannot create us free, to only do certain things, for this is a logically contradictory notion.

Our freedom to experience goodness entails accepting a correlating increase in the capacity to stray from the divine will, and thus bring suffering upon us.

Those beings with the greatest power of self-determination, and hence the greatest power to deviate from the divine will for the good of the whole, necessarily have the greatest power to influence others - for good or ill. The capacity to create and the capacity to destroy go hand in hand (Griffin p.109)

Therefore, to ask why God made the world with evil and suffering in it, is the wrong way to approach the matter. Evil and suffering would always be present in any number of 'possible worlds', so long as are beings who are responsible for their own actions. In short, the correlating principles of power/value (as set out in Part 1), would be a fundamental feature of any world or universe God created.

David Griffin is not seeking to exonerate God from being responsible for the way the world is. He is well aware that if God had not allowed evolution to begin and produce free-thinking creatures, then ultimately there would be no suffering in the world (either due to natural or human causes). However, this is a far cry from saying that God is directly responsible for all the evils in the world.

The consequences of having been given a choice

Now although the world cannot exist without the presence of suffering in it (for there will always be someone or something able to make 'bad choices'), God's benevolence keeps things from being worse than they could be. Although to us the world may look in a bad state, it is still a place where humans have the potential to become 'morally good beings'. As such, it cannot be all bad! Furthermore, if the world were not capable of producing morally good beings, then suffering would be unnecessary, and God would be rightly held accountable for this. Therefore, although we live in a 'less than perfect' world, we should not feel discontented:

While every advance in the creative process has been a risk, since greater sufferings were thereby made possible as well as greater goods, this has never been a risk which God has urged us creatures to run alone. It has always been a risk for God too. In fact God is the only being who has experienced every single evil that has occurred in the creation. This means that God is the one being in a position to judge whether the goods achievable have been worth the price (Griffin p.111)

So 'moral evil' (e.g. murder, rape etc.), occur in the world because people can choose to do these things. But what about 'natural evil' - this being suffering caused by non-moral agents (e.g. earthquakes, volcanoes etc.)? As far as Griffin is concerned, most theodicy's fail to address the problem of evil and suffering at the sub-human level. The usual response is to say either that evil never occurs there, or is the work of a diabolical agent (E.g. Satan). Griffin rejects both these options in favour of one which sees all creatures, no matter how big or small, as having the power to deviate from the divine will. Thus, although 'low-grade' entities do not have that much power in themselves to deviate significantly from the divine will, taken together they can result in significant deviations. The net result of this is that there was never a time when the creation was perfect.

Something to think about: Do you believe Griffin's explanation of natural evil is credible? For instance, do you believe 'low grade entities' such as atoms, have a form of 'freewill' and can collectively be held responsible for earthquakes occurring?

Why is God so limited?

One could ask why God does not change the world to make it a 'better place' (such that there would be no more evil and suffering)? Well, this is because aside from it being the best of all 'possible worlds' (because it is the one God actually brought into existence), God cannot force anyone or anything to do what God wants, but (as with all creation) can only persuade them to achieve their highest potential. Now where we find 'higher' levels of self-determining activity (e.g. in humans), things can happen quickly here, and as such rapid changes of behaviour can occur. Yet with 'low-grade' entities (e.g. cells, atoms etc.), self-determining activity is not as developed, so any change will inevitably occur over a longer period of time. In the case of non-living things (e.g. rocks and plants), these cannot be influenced or persuaded by God to change their behaviour. For instance, God cannot persuade a rock or a tree not to fall on someone.

On the basis of all this, Griffin offers three working hypotheses:

Things which cannot deviate much from the divine will, cannot be influenced by God very quickly.
Things which can be influenced by God quickly, can deviate drastically from the divine will.
Things which can do nothing on their own, cannot be directly influenced by God at all.

The key point here is that in order to preserve freewill, God cannot do anything to change things in the world in a direct ('hands on') sense, but only indirectly through persuading those things which have a will, to consider alternative courses of action (or activity).

Concluding remarks

In conclusion, Griffin offers some thoughts on how process theodicy relates to matter of faith. Firstly, he rejects any belief based on 'revelation', which is 'self-contradictory'. For example, he rejects the idea that God determines all events, but at the same time says that humans are free beings and responsible for their own actions. For Griffin, this is sheer nonsense. Either God determines all events, and so we are not free to do what we choose, or God does not (and so we truly are free to do what we choose). Secondly, he rejects the idea that beliefs must be logically consistent, in favour of the notion that beliefs should present/reflect the most probable view of reality. In light of this, Griffin believes it is important for theologians to assess Christian 'revelation', as it relates to their present social and scientific context. They should not, 'try to hold onto their formulations at any price' (Griffin p.115). For instance, if a scientific theory has such a weight of 'evidence' to suggest it has 'factual status' (e.g. the theory of evolution), then this must be acknowledged within the theological enterprise, in order for a credible (and relevant) theology to be worked out.

It is the task of the Christian theologian to help people arrive at a set of beliefs that are worthy and that can, at that time and place, be somewhat readily apprehended as convincing, so that the beliefs about the Christian God can become a perception of this God as the Holy Reality (Griffin p.118)

Finally, Griffin believes that holding onto what we believe are 'orthodox' notions about God when attempting to construct a credible theodicy (e.g. God is omnipotent), may ultimately lead us into theological and philosophical positions which do more to discredit Christian belief, than not. For instance, if we are to accept the presence of genuine evil in the world, then Griffin believes this should not be an embarrassment to Christian theology, but a fact to be adequately answered from the Christian standpoint. In terms of process theodicy, rejecting divine omnipotence means it is more than capable of addressing these matters, than others.