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On the Ultimate Origination of Things (G. W. Leibniz)Information: A review of G. W. Leibniz's cosmological argument, where he suggests that God's existence is the only viable explanation as to why this world and universe exist. Leibniz's essay 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things' (3rd December 1697), was reprinted in Philosophical Writings. All quotes are from this source, unless otherwise indicated. A version of this article was originally published on the website www.faithnet.org.uk. Introduction'However far you go back to earlier states, you will never find in those states a full reason why there should be any world rather than none, and why it should be as it is. Therefore, even if you suppose the world eternal, as you will still be supposing nothing but a succession of states and will not in any of them find a sufficient reason... it is evident that the reason must be sought elsewhere.'
Although modern cosmological studies suggest that the theory of the 'big bang' best explains the material origins of our universe (its cause), Leibniz would say that it does not explain why it is here? Furthermore, it does not give us any reason as to why our universe has the specific 'laws' it does, why it was led to be structured and ordered the way it is, why has life emerged in it, and also why consciousness (especially amongst humans) is a key feature of it?
Logically God! One certainty we know of the universe through modern cosmological studies, is that it is a contingent thing. That is, it only exists now because certain conditions arose in the past, which led it to be here. Thus the universe has not always been here, nor is it likely to remain in existence. Leibniz would agree with this. However, if this universe is contingent (could or could not be here) then the reason why it is here must be to do with something that has always existed. In other words, the reason why the world and the universe are here is must be found in that which has necessary existence (i.e. something which had to exist in order for anything else to be here). So if the reason why this present universe exists and is the way it is cannot be found within the material realm, then logically it must (according to Leibniz) lie outside of it (which also implies it is something different from that which is found in the world - i.e. it is not contingent). Furthermore, if this 'something' has to necessarily exist in order for anything else to be here, then this can only suggest one thing - the ultimate cause and explanation for why anything is here, is God! 'Even by supposing the world to be eternal we cannot escape... God.' As Leibniz was a Christian, we should not be surprised at this conclusion. Advertisement More on the notion of existence The key idea in cosmological arguments is that the world, the universe, and everything in them is dependent on something else for their existence - this being God! However, in order to arrive at the idea of God, one has to first show why God is a necessarily existent being (must have always be here), in contrast to the world and the universe (which as contingent things do not have to be here, nor have they always been here). One might feel that in utilising the matter of existence as a means for arguing that God exists, Leibniz has strayed into the territory of the The Ontological Argument. Leibniz starts off by saying that things exist in the world in direct proportion to the degree of potential they have for existing. In other words, if something has a high degree of potential for existing, then it is likely to exist. One might liken this to an artist having the ability to paint in a certain style. The more 'skill' (or potential) they have to do this, the more likely they are to create a painting in this manner (and vice versa).
'The reasons of the world then lie in something extra-mundane, different from the chain of states, or series of things, whose aggregate constitute the world... something which is of absolute or metaphysical necessity, for which no reason can be given.' So not only does the reason for the world being here (i.e. God) have to lie outside the physical realm, but also the reasons for the world being here. In other words, just as the cause of the physical world and universe being here is found in an-other realm, so the reasons for this happening can be found there too. This means that the reason for something being here rather than nothing is an eternal truth, and as such they necessarily exist in order to make sense of the world we live in. Eternal truths are also known as a priori truths, and said to be always true no matter what the case. As such, they typically function as the basis of knowledge and morality, and are often said to be the foundation of religious truth-claims. They are also normally contrasted with a posteriori knowledge, which is knowledge grounded in our experience of things around us. Many consider scientific knowledge to be a posteriori. The reason for this world So Leibniz believes he has established the reason as to why the world exists, but why this world with all its imperfections? For surely the question begs; if God created this world, why did God create one where evil and suffering occurs? Why not instead of this one, create one which is both physically and morally perfect? Leibniz is here addressing the problem of evil and suffering, which was famously outlined by David Hume (1711-1776) in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) in the following manner: 'Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then [God] is impotent. Is [God] able, but not willing? then [God] is malevolent. Is [God] both able and willing? [why is there] evil?' [Brackets mine].
For to say God should have done better, is like accusing a world renowned painter of creating bad works of art. Maybe it is not so much that they could (and should) have done better, but that they did the best they could but we simply do not like their work. In this instance, to say that we do not like someone's work is not to say that they are a bad artist, but simply to say that we have a different opinion as to what 'good' and 'bad' art is. So Leibniz argues that not only must this be the best of all possible worlds God could have created, but that we are in no position to pass the judgement on 'God's handiwork', that things could and should be better than they are: 'It is unreasonable... to give a judgment without inspecting the whole... We have knowledge of only a tiny part of that eternity which stretches out immeasurably. For how small a thing is the memory of a few thousand years which history hands down to us! And yet out of so little experience we rashly make judgements about the immeasurable and the eternal.' In fact, he even goes so far as to say that God intended there to be 'evil and suffering' in the world for our good: 'The great composers frequently mingle dis-chords with harmonious chords.' 'It has an insipid effect if we always eat sweet things; sharp, acid and even bitter things should be mixed in to stimulate the taste. He who has not tasted what is bitter has not earned what is sweet, nor will he appreciate it.' 'Afflictions are for the short time being evil, but in effect good, since they are short cuts to a greater perfection... destruction and oppression contributes to achieve something greater.' In doing so, Leibniz seems to be advocating a form of Irenaean Theodicy. Advertisement Some issues So the reason why there is something here rather than nothing, is simply because God wanted there to be something here rather than nothing (and also that God wanted this world to be here, rather than any other). Yet although Leibniz has presented (what for him) is a suitable reason for this world being here, the fact is that his method ultimately undermines his attempt to do so. For instance, Leibniz argues that the reason why the world is here is found in God, who is not a part of this world, has necessary existence, and is also a being whose existence has no reason for it ('The reasons of the world then lie in something extra-mundane, different from the chain of states, or series of things, whose aggregate constitute the world... something which is of absolute or metaphysical necessity, for which no reason can be given.'). However, he also classes metaphysical truths (such as the reason for the world's existence) in the same category as God, which essentially undermines the value of these truths in his scheme of things:
This means that Leibniz's explanation as to why there is something here rather than nothing, will only really work for those who already believe God exists (which begs the question as to why they are needed in the first place). In fact, we do not even need to postulate a God to explain why there is a world (and universe), for it might be that there is no reason why anything is here - it just is! 'I should say the universe is just there, and that's all.' (Bertrand Russell) Also, unless one agrees that a reason for anything being here needs to be found in the first place, there is no reason to even consider Leibniz's arguments: 'If one refuses to even sit down at the chess board and make a move, one cannot, of course, be checkmated' (F. R. Coplestone). In the end, all Leibniz is saying (and can say) is that he believes God created this world, and that despite all the problems in it, that this must have been the best world God have made. And that's it really - that is the reason why there is something here, rather than nothing! |

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'Let
us suppose the book of the elements of geometry to have been eternal, one copy
always to have been written down from an earlier one; it is evident that, even
though a reason can be given for the present book of a past one, nevertheless
out of any number of books taken in order going backwards we shall never come
upon a full reason... why there are books at all, and why they were written in
this manner.'
Now the fact that there is a world and a universe, means that it must have
(logically) had a high degree of potential for existing (otherwise it would not
be here). However, that fact that it potentially existed at one time, meant that
there was a time when it did not exist. We should not be surprised at this
notion, seeing as Leibniz has already established that the world and the
universe are contingent things (need not exist). So in order for this potential
for existence in the world and universe to be realised, we
need to have something which existed prior to them existing; which would also
be the cause (or reason) as to why they began to exist in the first place. Furthermore, this thing must be a necessarily existing
thing, otherwise we would go back to square one - 'If x is the reason why the world
and the universe is here, what is the reason why x is here etc.?'